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I. INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes the Restatement of Employment Law' as a
whole, using mostly (though not entirely) Chapter 3 for examples.
Part II addresses the core question about the Restatement: can it
succeed at "restating" employment law, or is the effort doomed from
the start? Part II argues that criticisms of the Restatement are based in
sound legal realist theory but are overstated as a case against the
entire concept of a restatement, particularly for certain fields, like the
compensation and benefits law of Chapter 3 that, moreso than other
fields, are based on established law.
Part III(A), notes that Chapter 3 does a strong job restating
established common law, but undertakes several empirical analyses to
answer a key question: Is there any value in restating established law?
The findings from a series of ordinary least-squares regressions show
that restatements do appear useful to certain states.
(1)Caselaw volume varies substantially across states. A fifty-state
comparison of the caselaw volume in several Westlaw searches,
spanning different areas of commercial and employment contract law,
show that many states have one-tenth as much caselaw as others.
(2)Caselaw volume varies predictably with state characteristics.
State caselaw volume is not random, because almost all of the
variation is predictable by three state characteristics: population,
income per capita, and years existing as a state - though with
interesting differences between employment caselaw and basic
1. Unless otherwise noted, "the Restatement" refers to the RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW
(AM. LAW. INST. 2015).
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contract caselaw.
(3)Low-caselaw states cite Restatement provisions significantly
more. States with less caselaw, and with qualities predicting less
caselaw, actually do cite Restatements significantly more - confirming
that lower-population, and to an extent lower-income and younger
states, do use Restatements to fill gaps in their low-volume caselaw.
Part 111(B) notes that Chapter 3 takes clear stances for broader
employee rights on several important compensation law points on
which states vary: enforceability of policy statements; rights to
deferred compensation (like commissions) unpaid as of termination;
and implied covenant of good faith rights against terminations
depriving imminently due pay. Two key caveats as to this employeerights orientation are (a) that, unsurprisingly for a Restatement,
Chapter 3 is more of a subtle nudge than an aggressive push toward
broader employee rights, and (b) that while some other chapters
similarly nudge in a pro-employee direction, such as Chapter 5 on
discharges in violation of public policy, others do not, such as Chapter
1 on volunteers and Chapter 8 on employee loyalty and noncompetition.
After Part 111(B) discusses the merits of the Restatement's
positions, Part 111(C) levies two criticisms of the quality of its work.
First, it occasionally cites inapt caselaw, undercutting the
Restatement's role as persuasive authority that is useful only to the
extent it persuades that its work is sound and well-supported. Second,
like all Restatements, it scatters its points across a mix of (a) boldfaced
black-letter text, (b) "comments," (c) "illustrations," and (d)
"reporters' notes" - leaving the hierarchy of authority far less clear
than the authors presumably intended, and even leaving unclear
which categories the authors as a whole actually adopted.
The Conclusion notes that the Restatement's imperfections,
however, do not doom the project. The simple errors are material
limitations on the persuasiveness of the work, but none undercut the
Restatement's substantive points; and the half-way nature of the
Restatement's assertions of law are inevitable by-products of needing
an ideologically diverse author team. Despite its imperfections, the
Restatement of Employment Law makes a material contribution to
clarifying employment law and nudging, on the whole, toward more
robust employee rights.
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II. IN FAVOR OF A RESTA TEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, AND
AGAINST IT'S -ALL-INDETERMINATE NIHILISM - ESPECIALLY AS TO
SUBJECTS, LIKE THE CONTRACT-BASED COMPENSATION LAW OF
CHAPTER 3, NOT AS INDETERMINATE AS OTHERS

Is the Restatement of Employment Law a success? Answering
that requires first asking a more fundamental question: Is "restating"
employment law even possible? Specifically: can existing law be
described in an authoritative treatise, or does such an effort inevitably
just choose favored policy views? The simplest answer might be
"both": "As with any Restatement, Employment Law reflects a
tension between faithfully reflecting the prevailing law and improving
that law by choosing the better rule."2 But this is a big question
deserving serious analysis, not just the usual shrug that both sides in
any debate probably have some validity.
One side argues the Restatement well-describes existing law - the
view of its authors and advisors, such as Justice Christine M. Durham:
The benefits of ...
Restatements, and this Restatement in
particular, are ... the doctrinal organization, the identification of
issues, the bringing of order to the process, and the
of areas which are open and evolving ....
identification ...
a
Restatements are more descriptive than prescriptive[,] ...

collection of the judicial thinking[,] ...

the classic definition of

black letter.3

On the other side are critics who see the Restatement as not
neutral description, but policy advocacy favoring the status quo.
Some, like Professor Charles Sullivan, are nuanced, delineating how
on some issues the Restatement adopts "dubious ... policy choices"
yet on others it "fail[s] to address issues of potential importance
where it could have made some improvements or at least offered
useful guidance." 4 Professor Reuel Schiller more broadly declares the
project doomed from the start, answering his rhetorical question, "is
there a law to restate," in the negative:
[T]he real "problem". . . the Restatement raises: is there a law to
restate, or do we simply have the "laws" of employment ...
competing for adherents, justified by political preferences and
[C]reation of the
differing conceptions of social justice? ...
Restatements [is] a political process, cloaked with and informed by
2. Charles A. Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1391
(2015).

3. Judge Marsha S. Berzon et al., Judicial Assessment of the Restatement of Employment
Law, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 1453, 1460 (2015).
4. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1421.
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expertise, but essentially politics.

This is no new debate. In law as in science fiction, "[a]ll this has
happened before - and will happen again, again, again .. . ."' Whether
describing "objective, black-letter" law is just politics echoes the
century-old formalism-versus-realism debate.
[In] the 1920s and 1930s,.. .Legal Realists were skeptical of the old
formalis[m] . ... [L]aw was not a value-free system of objective,
black-letter rules .. .. Legal rules [and] decisions .. . were hardly

neutral . . despite the Formalists' claim . . [to] apply[] timeless
legal principles . . . "scientifically" discovered.... Realists took
a[n]... instrumental view... [that] principles are not carved in
stone but are malleable .... In the words of the proto-realist
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time,... moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share . . .,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining . . law[, which] cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
Given this history, debate over the Restatement's success or
failure must acknowledge the deep roots of the debate over whether
its law-describing mission is even possible. This in one sense makes
the debate more interesting, but in another sense less so: If isdescribing-law-possible is a century-old debate, it would be stunning
if someone actually conjured a new point missed by everyone from
Holmes and Llewellyn to a slew of brilliant modern scholars whom,
for fear of omitting someone I admire, I will mostly not name. While
I will not resolve a century-old debate, I take a generally supportive
view of the Restatement, in particular of the compensation-andbenefits chapter I analyze in depth, Chapter 3. Because I agree that,
given the "now uncontroversial notion that many cases pose
indeterminate questions,.. . we're 'all legal realists now,"'9 I must
5. Reuel Schiller, "It Is Not Wisdom, but Authority That Makes A Law:" A Historical
Perspectiveon the Problem of Creatinga Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 39, 42 (2009).
6. Battlestar Galactica: Razor" Quotes, IMDB, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0991178/
quotes>.
7. Stephen R. Alton, Roll over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of
American Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 352-53 (2010) (quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (Legal Classics Library
1982) (1881)).
8. One example: Pierre Schlag's brilliant deconstruction of so many debates - formalism
and realism, transaction cost analysis, etc. - makes me feel that he is Morpheus in The Matrix,
killing my worldview by showing that the reality I knew never existed. E.g., Pierre Schlag,
Formalismand Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2009).
9. Edward Cantu, Posner'sPragmatismand the Turn Toward Fidelity, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
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explain why I still view the Restatement as, overall, a useful
contribution, albeit an imperfect one due to the limits of diverse
authors coalescing around specific positions.
Most, but not all, adherents to legal realism, and to the critical
legal studies movement echoing realism's view that indeterminacy
makes policy pervade law, offer more than "a nihilistic response to
the attempt to assign to law any discernible content independent of
the moral and political desires of those .... mak[ing] decisions in the
name of the law."'0 But some edge toward nihilism in espousing "the
indeterminacy thesis" that "the existing body of legal doctrines ...
permits a judge to justify any result she desires in any particular
case.

...

[A] competent adjudicator can square a decision in favor of

either side in any given lawsuit with the existing body of legal rules.""
Professor Mark Tushnet argues, for example, that "each decision
reworks its precedents," "constraints on judges ... are clearly not
terribly restrictive," and "in any interesting case any reasonably
skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she wants."1 2 Saying he
speaks of "interesting" cases arguably avoids pure nihilism, but a
passing caveat hardly weakens multiple strong declarations of
indeterminacy. Professor David Kairys declares that "legal reasoning
does not provide concrete, real answers to particular legal or social
problems," law is just "a variety of stylized rationalizations that a
judge may freely choose from [because] ... [t]hese rationalizations go
every which way," and thus "nothing []in the law ... determines
which rationalization a judge should choose in particular situations.""
Kairys might try to caveat out of nihilism by briefly admitting, "[a]ll
outcomes are not equally likely." 4 Yet he then clarifies that "it is only
the social context in a particular situation that makes one outcome
more likely than another."" If only social whim makes one outcome
more likely than another, then handicapping outcomes is no more
feasible than handicapping social whim.
L. REv. 69, 72 (2012)
10. Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said than Done, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1466, 1470 (1983) (critiquing those critical theorists arguing indeterminacy especially strongly).
11. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCritical Dogma, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 462, 462 (1987) (explaining, but critiquing rather than adopting, such strong-form
assertions of the indeterminacy thesis).
12. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 818-19 (1983).
13. David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 243, 244-47 (1984).
14. Kairys, supra note 13, at 247.
15. Id
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Realist theorists deserve credit for anticipating the Restatement
debate a century ago - but in one key way they have it easy, which is
how they descend into I-get-it-you-don't nihilism. Pure theorists are
freed from the tough tasks facing practicing lawyers, judges, and some
other scholars:
(1)actually setting legal doctrine - as appellate judges commonly
do;
(2)actually deciding individual cases - as trial judges commonly
do;
(3)actually advising clients that they can do X freely, that they
cannot do Y without consequence Z, or that Z is probabilistic
because of ambiguity in applicable law - as lawyers must do; and
(4)analyzing work of the above types by judges and lawyers alike
- as done by the subset of scholars engaged with actual cases.
Those dealing with actual cases know that while "many cases
pose indeterminate questions,"16 many do not, as Professor Frederick
Schauer has noted:
Law is not only about hard cases. There are easy ones ....
[U]nderstanding law requires awareness not only of litigated
and . .
appealed disputes, but. .. routine application of legal
rules .... [T]he everyday determinacy of law [includes] the
production of clear guidance and uncontested outcomes by
straightforward legal language, black-letter law, and ...
conventional . .
reasoning.... Realism's skepticism about the
constraints of ...
law applies only to ...
[a] sliver of legal
events ....
That law is determinate in the many easy cases theorists rarely
address can hardly be denied by any realistic form of realism. Holmes
himself, an early "proto-realist,"" was no nihilist rejecting any project
of accurately describing the law. While spurring early legal realism by
observing that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic... as if... a
book of mathematics," instead deriving from "necessities of the
time," morality, politics, and prejudices, Holmes placed a high
priority on describing law so as to predict outcomes: "The object of
our study," Holmes wrote at the start of The Path of the Law, "is
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through
16. Cantu, supra note 9, at 72.
17. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEx. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (2013).
18. Stephen R. Alton, Roll over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of
American Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 353 (2010) (quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (1881)) (other citations
omitted).
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the instrumentality of the courts."" Such work requires both
describing the law as it is and deciding what the law should be in the
face of case-specific ambiguities and controversies between multiple
legal rules.
Thus the strongest Restatement criticism - that trying to restate
indeterminate law is just choosing values - reprises the nihilistically
strong form of indeterminacy theory that lacks real-world nuance.
True, describing law in a tome courts accept might make current law
persist. Yet with most cases not in the grey area of "interesting
case[s]" theorists address,20 but instead requiring "routine
application" of law,2 1 clarifying the law has real value to the
Holmesian project of "prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts."

22

Further, assume a nihilist all-is-indeterminate theory is right: if
the law is so indeterminate that judges can decide cases in any way,
then a Restatement hardly binds future judges who may disagree with
its choices. If law is too indeterminate for a Restatement, it is too
indeterminate for a Restatement to ossify law.
As in many theoretical debates, is-describing-law-possible is a far
too general framing of the question. Some fields feature far more
indeterminacy than others, and those seeing "law" as indeterminate
use examples disproportionately from highly charged areas of
constitutional law, like reproductive, speech, and criminal defense
rights.23 Many areas of employment and labor law are just as highly
charged, and thus infused with too much politics to restate neutrally,
such as certain statutes and common-law doctrines on labor rights.24
But the reality that politics may dominate those fields proves little
about the determinacy of common-law contract and tort rights, which
can be quite clear in the run of everyday cases.
Where do the topics within the Restatement of Employment Law
fit into the spectrum of how indeterminate various legal fields are?
The short answer is, "middle"; the longer answer is that employment
law is such a heterogeneous mix that some subfields are far more
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 457 (1897).
20. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 819.
21. Schauer, supra note 17, at 749.
22. Holmes, supra note 19, at 457.
23. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 12, at 815-20 (citing constitutional law examples in those
areas).
24. See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 13, at 248, 258-60 (citing labor and employment examples in
those areas).
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heavily laden with indeterminacy-driven policy choices than others.
As the Restatement acknowledges, states vary greatly on major issues
such as to what extent states should bar discharges against public
26
policy 25 or non-competition agreements, just to pick two issues

earning whole or nearly whole chapters. But employment law
features a great many cases that well-settled law can dispose of with
clarity, given (for example) the nearly universal employment-at-will
rule that makes the vast majority of terminations perfectly lawful"
and the uncontroversial applicability of basic contract principles to
most compensation disputes." Thus not all, but much, of employment
law is a field that well-typifies "the everyday determinacy of law," as
Schauer put it, because the field "is not only about hard cases," but
also about those susceptible to "clear guidance" based on
"straightforward legal language [and] black-letter law." 29
In sum, I find overstated the argument that a Restatement cannot
succeed because all it can do is ossify current policy choices. That risk
exists, but varies: in areas with less indeterminacy, like employment
contracts and compensation, a Restatement is most feasible; in more
indeterminacy-driven areas, a Restatement likely would not stop states
from choosing differently. I take a relatively positive view of a
Restatement not as a reflexive supporter of existing doctrine; I have
long agreed with Restatement critics on substantive employment law,
such as arguing for a broader range of at-will exceptions,3 for wage
law to protect earned pay against forfeiture,31 and for protecting
deferred pay against opportunistic firing with an implied covenant of
good faith.3 2 The latter two points - compensation and benefits - are
25. See generally RESTATEMENT

&

OF EMP'T LAW ch. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
26. See generally id. ch. 8.
27. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in its Place, 13 EMP. RTS.
EMP. POL'Y J. 143, 154 (2009) (seeing "little value in expending political capital over whether
employment at will is in fact the default rule, a decided point").
28. E.g., Soderlun v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Col., 944 P.2d 616, 619 (Colo. 1997) (holding that the
common law "has not purported to create any special rules ... [for] employee claims of contract
breach[.] Hence, our analysis ... must comport with ... traditional contract precepts").
29. Schauer, supra note 17, at 749.
30. Scott A. Moss, Where There's at-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing
Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. Prrr. L. REV. 295 (2005) (arguing to harmonize
states' at-will exceptions: implied covenant; fraudulent inducement; public policy discharge).
31. Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., No. 11-CV-02755-JLK-KMT, 2014 WL 1101446, at
*1 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2014) (denying Defendant's motion for new trial after unpaid wage
judgment for Plaintiff: "Mr. Reyes was entitled to recover for his last five days . .. Snowcap had
no legal setoff . . . for $ 5103 .... loaned to Mr. Reyes to fund his efforts to obtain a work visa").
32. DeGraffenreid v. DebtTraders, Inc., NASD Dispute Resolution No. 01-03149 (Dec. 10,
2002), <http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/aao-documents/01-03149-Award-NASD-200212
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within Restatement Chapter 3, which Section III now analyzes.
III. THE SUCCESSES OF CHAPTER 3: STRENGTHENING RIGHTS TO
DEFERRED PAY AND CLARIFYING CONTRACT AND COMPENSATION
LAW THAT, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS SHOWS, IS SPARSE IN MANY
STATES THAT THUS RELY MORE ON RESTA TEMENTS

Chapter 3 of the Restatement covers compensation issues that,
because they base on relatively well-established contract law, are
among the fields most readily susceptible to a Restatement. Yet even
Chapter 3 features policy-based decision-making on key disputed
issues, and its need to delve into disputed policy-making results in a
somewhat confusing mix of different types of guidance.
As subpart A notes, Chapter 3 does a strong job describing
existing consensus law - which can help states lacking a strong body of
relevant precedent. Several empirical analyses in subpart A confirm
the striking dearth of caselaw in certain types of states, including on
compensation law - and that such states do cite Restatements
especially often to fill in their caselaw gaps.
As subpart B details, Chapter 3 does a strong job taking stands
on important issues on which states are split: (1) enforceability of
employer policy statements; (2) rights to deferred compensation
(especially commissions) not yet paid when employment ends; and (3)
implied covenant of good faith rights against an employer terminating
an employee to avoid some imminently due payment. Notably, the
Restatement resolved all three of those issues in favor of broader
employee rights - which the Restatement as a whole arguably did, but
to a modest degree, and with other chapters adopting more proemployer stances.
As subpart C details, the Restatement as a whole suffers from two
weaknesses in its craftsmanship:on several key points, cited caselaw is
inapt or overstated; and all Restatements engender confusion by
splitting their points among a mix of black-letter text, "comments,"
"illustrations," and "reporters' notes" - leaving unstated the
hierarchy of authority, or which ones the authors actually adopted.

0.pdf> (awarding $145,514 plus fees on claims of implied covenant of good faith and state wage
law, where employee proved termination aimed to deprive impending deferred compensation).
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A. Fifty-State EmpiricalAnalysis Confirms the Value of Restating the
Law: Some States Have Far Less Caselaw and Rely More on
Restatements
Much compensation law applies established contract law, just
with occasional ambiguities and departures in some states. Chapter 3
recites prevailing law clearly, adding clarity by rejecting arguments
that fail in most, but not all, states.
* Sanctity of earned pay. Even at-will employees enjoy basic
contract rights to compensation they already did the work to earn,33
sections 3.01-3.03 confirm, including the undisputed part of any pay
under dispute.
* Policy statements can bind. Per sections 3.01-3.02, employees
can rely on policy statements short of formal contracts as long as
circumstances show intent to bind to a commitment definite enough
to enforce.
* Ability to modify or revoke prior binding statements. While
employer promises and policy statements can bind, they differ from
individual or collectively bargained agreements, in that employers
can modify or revoke them, but only upon reasonable notice, and
not if an individual employee reasonably, detrimentally relied upon
the commitment.3

But the straightforwardness of much compensation and benefits
law is a mixed bag: it makes a restatement more feasible and
legitimate, yet less useful. What is the point of restating law so wellestablished it is easy to restate? One answer is that where law is
relatively uniform, Restatements help states with less caselaw. I have
practiced in Colorado, where caselaw can be sparse, so lawyers
33. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (as to compensation
generally: "Whether the employment relationship is terminable at will or terminable only for
cause, employees have a right to be paid the wages, salary, commissions, and other forms of
compensation they have earned"); id. § 3.02(a) (same for bonuses and incentive pay); id. §
3.03(a) (same for benefits).
34. Id. § 3.01(c) (as to compensation generally: "Employees have a right to be timely paid
the wages, salary, and other compensation they have earned. If there is a bona fide dispute as to
whether all ... has been earned, the employee has a right to be timely paid any part ... not in
dispute"); id. § 3.02(c) (same, bonuses and incentive pay); id. § 3.03(c) (same, benefits).
35. Id. § 3.01(b) (as to compensation generally: "Whether compensation has been earned is
determined by the agreement... or any relevant binding employer promise or... policy
statement"); id. § 3.02(b) (same, bonuses and incentive pay); id. § 3.03(a) (same, benefits).
36. (a) ... employer may prospectively modify or revoke any prior binding employer
promise or .. . policy statement on compensation by providing reasonable notice ....
(c) ... modifications and revocations cannot, absent agreement with the affected
employees: (1) adversely affect rights under any agreement between the employer and
the employee (including any collective-bargaining agreement); or (2) adversely affect
any vested or accrued employee rights ... created by a binding employer policy
statement, or by reasonable detrimental reliance on a binding employer promise.
Id. §§ 3.04(a),(c) (citations to other Restatement sections omitted).
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commonly research other states and secondary sources, and in New
York, where there is so much caselaw that other citations are less
often needed, and thus less common.
But serious analysis cannot be based on unproven, anecdotal
conventional wisdom such as that some states have much less caselaw
than others and use Restatements to fill in caselaw gaps. I undertook a
series of empirical analyses to examine whether the following
hypotheses supporting the utility of a restatement are true:
(1)that caselaw volume varies substantially across states;
(2)that caselaw volume varies not randomly, but predictably by
state characteristics,making certain states reliably low- or highcaselaw;
(3)that low-caselaw states do cite Restatements more, rather than
cite other states' cases, other secondary sources, or less authority
overall.
Each of the four subparts below details the data, methodology,
and findings of the empirical tests of each of the four hypotheses
above.
1. Finding #1: States Caselaw Volume Varies Quite Substantially
The first empirical analysis simply attempted to measure the
volume of caselaw in each state on employment contracts and
compensation, as well as on basic contract law generally (for
comparison, and because employment contract/compensation law is,
to a large extent, a subset of basic contract law).
The problem is that there is no plausible way to count all contract
cases, or all employment contract/compensation cases, in a state: there
are far too many; and any caselaw search would be both overinclusive
(e.g., decisions on any subject may have the word "contract" appear
once) and underinclusive
(e.g., cases about employment
"handbooks," "manuals," "policies," or other words sometimes used
to characterize contractually binding documents). Thus, any count of
cases appearing in a search would be merely a proxy for the state's
total caselaw volume, not a full count of the state's cases.
Accordingly, the goal was to find searches that would be reliable
proxies for the state's caselaw volume in the area (employment
contracts/compensation or basic contracts). If multiple different
searches yielded highly correlated results - that is, if two searches
generated similar lists of which states had high or low caselaw volume
- then those searches are reliable proxies.
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I ran searches counting each state's number of reported decisions
in each of four Westlaw searches: two broad searches on employee
contracts or compensation - one on when employee bonuses or
commissions become guaranteed (search la below), the other on
employment contract modification (search 1b); and two similarly
broad Westlaw searches on more basic contract doctrines not limited
to the context of employment - consequential damages (search 2a)
and anticipatory breach (search 2b).3 7 The results showed that caselaw
volume does not vary greatly by subtopic, in that the results of each of
the two topics correlation proved very high between each pair of
searches:
* the number of cases in each of the employment compensation
and contract searches (la and 1b) was 77.8 percent correlated
(i.e., r = .778); and
* the number of cases in each of the two basic contract searches
(2a and 2b) was 96.2 percent correlated (i.e., r = .962).
Thus, the quantity of contract caselaw, and of employment
contract/compensation caselaw, is highly consistent across different
search topics; for states with many anticipatory breach cases, for
example, almost all have many consequential damages cases too.
Searches la and lb therefore are fair proxies for the quantity of
employment contract and compensation caselaw in a state, while 2a
and 2b are fair proxies for the quantity of basic contract caselaw in a
state.
A tally of the search results in both areas, employment
contracts/compensation law and basic contract law, confirms that
states vary widely, not just modestly, in their caselaw volume - and
the ranges were quite similar in both areas:
* in employment contract/compensation, the top 25 percent of
states averaged almost ten times more cases (300) than the
bottom 25 percent (31); and
* in basic contract law, the top 25 percent of states averaged just
over eleven times more cases (428) than the bottom 25 percent
(38).

37. Following were the exact terms in each search:
* #1a: (bonus! commission!) /s (vest! guarantee!) /s (employee worker sales!)
* #1b: (modificationnovation revoc! revok! resci!) /s (contract!agreement!)/s (employee
worker)
* #2a: anticipat!/2 (breach! repudiat!)
* #2b: "consequentialdamages" /s (contract! agreement).
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Below, Table 1 shows the range of variation among states, then the
populations of the states in the top 25 percent and bottom 25 percent
by caselaw volume.
TABLE 1:
State Caselaw Volume, with Averages of Top & Bottom 25 percent of
States
2a+2b
Search
la+1b Search
#stat
#stat #cases
#cases
11(minimum) - 8
25(min.) - 39
7

43-57
67-79
83-88
90-97
101-150
152-180
230

7
5
6
4
7
6
-7

42-48
50-69
75-100
101-145
154-179
201-380
451

5
6
5
8
7
8
- 4

Avg. #cases, bottom Avg. #cases, bottom
Av,.
#cases,
top Avg.
#cases, top
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TABLE 2:
States with Top & Bottom 25 percent Caselaw Volume & Their State
Population Rank

State

Rank in:
Contract
Caselaw

State
Population

New York

1

3

Texas
California

2
3

2
1

Ohio
Connecticut

4
5

Pennsylvania
Illinois

6
7

7
29
6
5

Georgia
New Jersey
Missouri
Florida

8
9
10
11

9
11
18
4

Washington

12

13

New Mexico
North
Eaoa
Dakota

39

36

40

48

Montana
NewNw42
Hampshire
Wyoming
Vermont
West
Virginia
Nevada
Maine

41

44

South
Dakota
Rhode
Island
Hawaii

42
43
44

50
49

46

35

47

41

48

46

50

40

Thus, states vary in caselaw volume greatly - more than I, at
least, had assumed - and consistently across different areas of law.

2017]

THE VALUE OF THE RESTATEMENT

425

Table 2 shows one clear pattern: the top 25 percent of states by
caselaw volume were almost all high-population states; the bottom 25
percent were all low-population. But the caselaw-to-population
correlation is high, not perfect, warranting further analysis of whether
other identifiable state characteristics, beyond population, predict
caselaw volume.

-

2. Finding #2: Caselaw Variance is Not Random: Nearly ThreeQuarters of Variance is Predicted by Three Characteristics
Population, Income Per Capita, and Years Existing as a State
I ran multivariate ordinary least-squares regressions to examine
whether the number of cases in those searches correlated with three
characteristics that, I hypothesized, might influence the caselaw
volume of a state.
* Hypothesis 1: State population correlatespositively with caselaw
volume, simply because there will be more lawsuits where
there are more people. The dependent variable for this
hypothesis was state population as of 2010, the most recent
year with full census data.
* Hypothesis 2: State age correlates positively with caselaw
volume; states must exist to issue decisions, and new states' bars
and courts are less developed. The dependent variable was years
the state has existed since 1850, because few reported decisions
precede the mid-1800s.39
* Hypothesis 3: State income correlates positively with caselaw
volume, because high-income states have more lawyers and
affluent businesses funding caselaw-generating appeals. The
dependent variable for this hypothesis was per capita income in
2000, a year chosen to avoid possible skewing effects of the
recessions of 2001 and 2008."
38. See Annual Estimates of the Resident Population:April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, 2016
FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, <https://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsflpages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk> (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (2010
population by state).
39. See States Ranked by Date that State Entered the Union, IPL2, <http://www.ipl.org
/div/stateknow/dates.html> (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (year of admission of each state).
I tested other cutoffs: years since admission, since 1861, or since 1900; and a dummy
variable of whether a state was admitted before 1800, 1850, 1861, or 1900. The year that most
strongly correlated with number of decisions was 1850, though for the dummy variable, a cutof
of 1861 was more heavily correlated - but the superiority of both to a "total years since
admission as a state" variable confirm that years since the mid-1800s are most relevant.
40. See 50 States Incomes, NETSTATE, <http://www.netstate.com/states/tables/st-income.
htm> (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (2000 per capita income).

Population Estimates, AM.
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The regression findings indicate that caselaw volume does vary
with each of the hypothesized variables, but to different extents, and
differently by subfield.
* Population is the strongest predictor of caselaw volume, highly
significant for both basic contract and employment caselaw.
The significance rose after replacing the population and
caselaw volume variables with their natural logs, to correct for
the skewed distribution of each. The population-to-caselaw
relationship is essentially linear, confirming that the
relationship is simple: more people generate proportionately
more caselaw.
* State income predicted basic contract but not employment
caselaw, while state age predicted employment but not basic
contract caselaw - a surprising yet logical split: employment
cases base on the number of workers (i.e., state age and
population); contract cases may depend on businesses and
lawyers funding commercial suits through appeal.

I chose 2000, rather than 2010, because I wanted to avoid income being skewed by
recent events because what is under study is caselaw from long ago to present. The 2008
recession was deep, so it easily could have changed state incomes; the 2001 recession was mild
but, by centering around the tech sector, could have impacted income in certain states more
than others.
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TABLE 3:
OLS Regression Results, Caselaw Volume - Employment
Contract/Compensation (Models la-le) & Basic Contracts (2a-2c)
Model le
Model lb Madatis Modetl
ln(#Cases, employment contract &
compensation) (same dependent variable,
Model lb-le/

Model12a
#Cases,
Basic
Contract

MqgglI
Model 2c
ln(#Cases, basic
contract)same, Model
2b-2c]

&

Model
#Cases,
Emp.
Contract

Population

Compensa
tion
1.493E05***
(9.84)

In
(Population)
State age
(since 1850)

2.306E05***
(8.91)
0.667***

0.686***

0.649***

0.670***

0.651***

0.666***

(8.66)

(9.16)

(8.46)

(9.04)

(8.66)

(9.81)

0.441

5.631E-03*

5.676E
03**

7.562E-03

1.360E-03

(1.17)

(1.98)

(2.02)

(0.01)

(0.49)

State, pre1850?

0.267*
(1.77)

State, pre1861?

0.399**
(2.41)
4.914E-04 2.717E-06

2.675E-06

-9.702E-07

8.861E-

5139E-

5217E-

(0.21)

(0.16)

(0.16)

(0.06)

(2.23)

(3.17)

(3.26)

-44.27

-6.564***

-6.159***

-5.602***

-6.540***

-221.8

-6.820***

-6.866***

(-0.56)

(-6.37)

(-5.67)

(-5.03)

(-6.49)

(-1.67)

(-6.79)

(-6.92)

Observations 50

50

50

50

50

50

50

50

Adjusted R2 0.717

0.715

0.710

0.725

0.721

0.693

0.732

0.737

pmepita)

Constant

Thus, not only do some states have an order of magnitude less
caselaw, but the variance among states is not random: having less
caselaw is a predictable result of being a smaller state (as to both
basic contract and employment contract/compensation caselaw), a
poorer state (as to basic contract caselaw), and a newer state (as to
employment caselaw). So there is reason to suspect that a
Restatement, even as to law well-established in high-caselaw states,
might be of more use to many states - those with less caselaw, and
those that by their basic characteristics (population, income, age) are
less likely to generate much caselaw.
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3. Finding #3: States with Low Caselaw, and Qualities Predicting Low
Caselaw, Do Cite Restatement Provisions Significantly More
But the evidence of sparser caselaw in lower-population, lowerincome, and newer states shows only that such states might, or should,
rely on Restatements - not that they do. The two small "V"
jurisdictions instructively differ:
* Vermont legislatively declared its preferred persuasive
authority in the late 1700s - the common law of neighboring
states: "the legislature adopted 'that common law, as it is
generally practiced and understood in the New England states.
. . as the common law of this state."' 4 1
* The Virgin Islands legislatively declared that all Restatements
are not only preferred persuasive authority, but binding
authority: "[R]ules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatements . . . , shall be the rules of decision in the courts of
the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of
local laws to the contrary." 42
I ran regressions to examine whether lower-population or
younger states rely more on Restatements. Unfortunately, we will not
have enough data on citation to the Restatement of Employment Law
until years, or perhaps decades, after its 2015 publication. 43 Rather
than wait until 2035 to attempt a study, however, I approached the
question another way: examining states' usage of a different
Restatement on related common law - the Restatement of Contracts,
which dates to 1932.
Because low-population states have far less caselaw, they have
fewer cites to all authorities, including Restatements - so the question
is whether lower-caselaw states cite Restatements more per case. As a
measure of state caselaw that might cite the Restatement of Contracts,

41. For example, one small state, Paul S. Gillies, The Dawn of Vermont Common Law, VT.
B.J. & L. DIG., Dec. 1995, at 7, 7.
42. 1 V.I. CODE ANN. § 4 (2016). That statute drew criticism, see Kristen David Adams,
The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 423
(2004), and the Virgin Islands Supreme Court eventually declared that it can reject particular
Restatement provisions. Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp., No. 2011-0037, 2011 WL
6299025, at *5 (V.I. Dec. 15, 2011) (holding that, after 2004 statute expressly conferred
"supreme judicial power" on Virgin Islands Supreme Court, it "may determine the common law
without automatically and mechanistically following the Restatements").
43. As of late September, 2017, a Westlaw search showed only twenty cases, state or
federal, citing the Restatement of Employment Law: between 2009 and mid-2015, seven cited a
pre-publication draft; from mid-2015 to mid-September 2017, thirteen cited the published
version.
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I did searches on two basic contract law issues that vary little by state:
consequential damages" and anticipatory breach. 45 Broad searches for
state cases on each doctrine yielded over 4000 on each," and the
number of cases in each search was highly correlated across the fifty
states (r = .962, or a 96.2 percent correlation) - confirming that basic
contract caselaw volume is highly consistent across different searches.
So while these searches do not exhaustively tally all contract law, they
are a reliable proxy for the volume of contract caselaw.
I ran a regression to examine whether states cite the Restatement
of Contracts at a higher rate when they have less caselaw or when
they have the characteristics predicting caselaw volume - population,
income, and age. The findings indicate that low-caselaw states do cite
the Restatement at a significantly higher rate, as do states with various
of the characteristics correlated with caselaw volume:
* Caselaw volume significantly predicts Restatement cite rate
negatively, as expected: low-caselaw states cite the Restatement
more; high-caselaw states cite it less (Models 3a-3b in Table 4.)47
* Population significantly predicts Restatement cite rate
negatively, as expected: low-population states cite the
Restatement more; high-population states cite it less (Models 4-4d
in Table 5).48 The relationship held whether the model included
both other relevant state characteristics (income and age, in

&

44. While subtle state differences exist, all fifty recognize the doctrine and apply the rule
from the same leading case: "Hadley v. Baxendale has been recognized in American
jurisprudence as the definitive source for... when consequential damages may be
recovered. ... [It] is cited with approval by the highest court of 43 states.... The rule of Hadley
is accepted by the highest court of three states, but not by name.... In the remaining four
states, appellate decisions have referred to and accepted Hadley." Thomas A. Diamond
Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v.
Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 665-66 & n.3 (1994).
45. "The 1932 Restatement contains several provisions dealing with anticipatory
repudiation ... where a party states that he will not... perform." Alphonse M. Squillante,
Anticipatory Repudiation and Retraction, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 373, 377 (1973). "The doctrine
appears... well-settled throughout the... States," with the exception of two states but also
"substantial movement ... toward an acceptance" even in holdout states. David W. Robertson,
The Doctrineof Anticipatory Breach of Contract, 20 LA. L. REV. 118, 121-22 (1959).
46. Following were the searches: anticipat! /2 (breach! repudiat!) and "consequential
damages" Is (contract! agreement).
47. As expected, the statistical significance was higher, and the model was a better fit, after
replacing the number of cases (the variable in Model 3a) with the natural log of the number of
cases (the variable in Model 3b), to correct for the non-normal distribution of the variable due
to larger states having an order of magnitude more caselaw.
48. As expected, the statistical significance was higher, and the model was a better fit, after
replacing population (the variable in Model 4a) with the natural log of population (the variable
in Models 4b-4d), to correct for the non-normal distribution of the variable due to larger states
having an order of magnitude higher population.
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Model 4b) or just one of the other state characteristics (just age
in Model 4c, just income in 4d).
* State age significantly predicts Restatement citation rate
negatively, as expected: newer states cite the Restatement more;
older states cite it less (Models 4b & 4c in Table 4).
* Income significantly predicts Restatement citation rate
positively, which was neither expected nor unexpected: on the
one hand, higher-income states have more caselaw, which
predicts fewer Restatement cites; on the other hand, these
regressions control for population (the variable most strongly
driving caselaw volume), so they find only that, other things
being equal, higher-income states cite Restatements more. A
possible explanation is that, just as more income drives more
litigation, it also drives more deeply-researched briefings with
more citations, including to Restatements (Models 4b & 4d in
Table 4).
-
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TABLE 4
OLS Regression Results, Restatement of Contracts Citation
Rate - by State Caselaw Volume (Models 3a-3b) & State
Characteristics (4a-4d)
Model 4d

Model3b IModel 4a IModel 4b IModelA4
-MQd&L3a
Restatement Cites per Contract Case [same dependent variable, Model
3a-4c)

-2.723E-

#Cases, basic
contract

_____

(-2.82)

ln(#Cases, basic
contract)

-0.678***
(-3.94)

-9.914E-08***

Population

(-3.94)
-0.722***

-0.538**

-0.899***

(-4.08)

(-2.65)

(-5.31)

-0.020***

-0.016**

-0.013*

(-3.20)

(-2.43)

(-3.20)

1.692E-04***

1.687E04***

In(Population)

State age (since
1850)

Income
capita)

Constant

(per

1.596E-04***
(4.00)

(4.38)

(4.42)

3.080***

5.796***

1.529

11.24***

12.74***

1.779***

(12.05)

(5.602)

(1.184)

(4.762)

(4.619)

(4.767)

50

50

50

0.455

0.241

0.398

Observations

50

50

50

Adjusted R2

0.124

0.152

0.445
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TABLE 5:
For the Top- & Bottom-10 Restatement-Citing States, Comparison of
States'Ranks by Restatement Citations, by Population, by Age, & by
Income
RST-K

Rank:

Cites per Rank:RSTBasic K K Cite Rate

Rank: Age
Rank:
Rank:#Cases
Population of State
(basic K)

(per cap.)

Case
Alaska

6.56

Massachusetts

6.16

9

74

1

Hawaii

5.00

3

Maine

4.94

4

Pennsylvania

4.59

15

14

6

50

40

50

21

47

41

23

3

2

16

13

18

6

Rhode Island

4.52

6

Maryland

4.39

74

1

4

43

19

New Hampshire 4.10

9

Iowa

4.04

9

Oregon

3.91

125

Indiana

1.11

41

21

North Carolina

0.92

42

Virginia

0.90

Texas

5
10

4242
30

2Q

27

33

25

15

19

30

19

10

12

31

43

16

12

9

12

0.87

44

2

2

28

24

South Carolina

0.83

45

24

New York

0.82

46

3

11

4

31

8
20

40

California

0.79

47

3

1

Ohio

0.76

48

4

7

17

Georgia

0.33

49

8

9

4

2

23

25

18

45

15/20

17/20

112/20

12/20

Louisiana

0.19

T0

#states with predictor in expected half:

Table 5 lists the top and bottom ten states by rate of Restatement
of Contracts citation, and it shows each of those states' ranks among
the fifty states in contract caselaw volume, population, income, and
state age. The shaded ranks for caselaw volume, population, income,
or age show where the state is in the top half of what would be
expected to predict its Restatement citation rate. Several examples
and patterns illustrate that the top and bottom states largely reflect
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the regression findings about what state characteristics predict high or
low restatement cite rates - with some notable exceptions that appear
to have historical expanations.
* Alaska is first, and Hawaii third, in Restatement cites - as is
predicted by their rank in the bottom half of the states by
caselaw, population, and age, as well as their rank in the top
half of the states by income
* Most states in the top ten do have low caselaw, low population,
and either a low state age or a high state income; most in the
bottom ten have the opposite. The bottom row shows that
seventeen out of twenty of these states are where their
population predicts, fifteen out of twenty are where their
caselaw volume predicts, and twelve out of twenty are where
their state age and population predict.
* The most striking exceptions are Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania having top five Restatement cite rates despite
being high-caselaw, high-population, and old states - qualities
significantly predicting low rates.
The Massachusetts/Pennsylvania defiance of otherwise strong
patterns in which states cite Restatements is curious, but possibly
explicable by history. As of the 1930s creation of the Restatement of
Contracts, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had a disproportionate
share of the east coast legal establishment, and thus the national legal
establishment at the time. Perhaps courts in those states were early
adopters of the Restatement, making it logical that later courts in
those states would continue to rely on authority their states endorsed
and cited very early. Westlaw searches seem to confirm this
hypothesis: in the first decade after the Restatement's 1932
publication, it was cited by mid- to large-sized states from the east
coast to the midwest (i.e., states comparable to Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania) the following number of times:
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TABLE 6:
Selected States' Cites to the Restatement of Contracts (RST-K) in Its
First Decade
#RST-K Cites

(through 1942)
Pennsylvania

115

Massachusetts

62

New York

32

Maryland
Illinois
New Jersey

15
11
10

Ohio

7

Michigan

2

Virginia

2

Overall, the statistical findings in this subpart, summarized in the
below table, all corroborate each other.
(1)Some states have not just less caselaw, but much less caselaw,
often 90 percent less than other states - and that high variance
was nearly identical for basic contract law and for employment
contract/compensation law.
(2)The states with less caselaw are no random mix - they tend to
be lower-population, poorer, and younger states; so a
Restatement is especially useful to an identifiable set of states.
(3)The states with lower caselaw really do cite Restatement
provisions significantly more, showing that states do use
Restatements to fill the gaps when their caselaw is sparse.
The caveat on the above findings - that basic state characteristics
like population, age, and income do predict Restatement usage is - is
that Restatement usage depends as well on historical factors.
Specifically, some state courts start citing Restatement provisions soon
after that Restatement's publication, which makes those states as early
adopters more likely to continue citing that Restatement. That pathdependence of Restatement usage means that while we will not know
for many years or decades whether the Restatement of Employment
Law will prove to be widely used, its usage may well depend on
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whether many or few state courts start citing it in its first few years.
TABLE 7:
Summary of Variables & Findings in All OLS Regressions

Years Admitted
Income Per
since 1850
Capita (t=0.21)
(t=1.17)

#Cases(In),

Years Admitted

Employment Population(In)***
Contract &
(t=8.66, p<0.01)
Compensation

sldmitted Income Per
(t=1.98, p<0.10) Capita (t=0.16)

&

1(a)

#U~ases,
Employment
Population***
Contract
(t=9.84, p<0.01)
Compensation

(b)
(1) Caselaw
Volume, in
Employment
Contract
1(c)
Compensation,
Varies by State
Population, Age,
& Income

0.717

0715

&

#Cases(In),
Employment
Population(In)***
Contract &
(t=9.16, p<0.01)
Compensationp<.0

I

te

Income Per
'<.0
Capita (t=0.16)

0.725

1861?** (t=2.41, Income Per
p<0.05)
Capita (t=0.06)

0.725

sinc I1dmitte
(t=2.4)7, p<0.05)4

0.(721

#Cases(In)n Admitted Pre-

1(d)

Employment
Population(In)***
Contract &
(t=8.46, p<0.01)
Compensation
1(m)loy<ment
C ontract &

Population(In)***
(t=-9.04, p<0i.01)

(Compensation

#Cases,
Contract
2(a)

(Consequential
2() Ding;
(2) Caselaw
Anticipatory
Volume, in Basic
Breach)
Contract, Varies
by State
#Cases(In),
Population, Age,
Contract
& Income
(Consequential
2(b)
Ding;
Anticipatory

(3) Restatement 3(a)
Cite Rate Varies
by State Caselaw
Volume
3(b)

Kestatement
Citations per
Contract Case
Ratmecnt
Citations pe

Years Admitted Income Per

Capita**

Populationd*
(t--8.91, p<0.tll)

since 1850
(t=0.01)

Population(n)***
(t=8.66, p<0O.01)

Years Admitted Income Per
since 1850
Capita***
(t=0.49)
(t=3.17, p<0.01)

(t=2.23, p<0.05)

jOrases, Contract
Law*** (t=-2.82,
p<0.01)
#ases(In)4 Contr
ILaw*** (t=.3.13,

0.693

0.732

0.124

Contract Case .p<41A1)

Continue on next page
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4(a)

Restatement
Citations per Populaton*** (t=
Contract Case 3
p<0.01)

Years Admitted Income Per
since 1850***
Capita*** (t=(t=-3.20, p<0.01) 4.38, p<0.01)

0.445

4(h)

Restatement
Citations per (t=-4., p<0.01)
Contract Case

Years Admitted Income Per
since 1850**
Capita"** (t=(t=-2.43, p<01.05) 4.42, p<0.01)

0.456

Restatement
Citations per

Years Admitted
since 1850* (t=- -

(4) Restatement
Cite Rate Varies
by State
4(c)

Population, Age,
& Income

Population(=i2)"
Contract Case (t-2.65, p<0.05)

4(d)

Restatement
Population(In)***
Citations per (t=-53,p.0)
Contract Case

4(e)

Restatement
Citations per
Contract Case,
in Mid-50%
Pop. States

0.241

1.70, p<0.10)
-

Icome Per
Capit*** (t=4.0, p<0.01)

0.398

Years Admitted Income Per
since 1850* (t=- Capita*** (t=1.70, p<0.10)
4.00, p<0.01)
II

* Statistically significant dependent variables are in boldface: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Notes:

* Grey shading notes the final version, relied upon for findings, of each of the four models

* (In) notes where a variable was the natural log of the data (i.e., of population or of #cases)

-

B. Chapter 3 Takes Clear and Pro-Employee Stances on Disputed
Issues (Policy Statements, Deferred Pay, and Implied Covenants)
But with Modest Nudges, and Contraryto Other Chapters'ProEmployer Stances
One key critique of the Restatement overall was that, by
accepting the existing legal regime, it adopted the pro-employer
viewpoints that pervade the modern employment-at-will regime4 9 and
that support aggressive remedies for employers suing employees.o
49. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Conference on the American Law Institute's
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 17 (2009)
(reporting criticisms of Restatement by a Committee of the Labor Law Group that the author
chaired: "On the... presentation of the employment at will rule as the default rule..., the
working committee argues that this is the wrong time to construct a general Restatement in this
regard because there is significant diversity among the jurisdictions on default rules and because
this doctrine is in flux. The committee members worry that a Restatement enshrining such a
simple statement of the employment at will rule will chill further development of the law."
(citing Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: Employment Contracts:Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 93, 94-95
(2009)).
50. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1392 (noting that, "Ipilerhaps more than most
Restatements,... Employment Law was resisted at the outset precisely because of concerns
that it would faithfully reflect at least the dominant themes of the current law, thereby tending
to 'freeze' the law in undesirable forms .. . because, in the view of the opponents, the case law
was overly deferential to employers," and finding this critique valid as to the Restatement's
chapters on privacy and remedies law in particular).
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Yet even many Restatement critics admit that it "it is actually more
progressive than most of the decided cases" in many areas" - just not
as progressive as critics would have liked, because the Restatement
was bound to "faithfully reflect at least the dominant themes of the
current .. . case law." 5 2
Chapter 3 resolves several important, unsettled issues in
compensation law by siding with employees' arguments over
employers', as subpart 1 notes. Two key caveats to this observation
about the Restatement's pro-employee stances, however, are detailed
in subpart 2: (a) unsurprisingly for a Restatement, Chapter 3 is more a
subtle nudge than an aggressive push toward broader employee
rights; and (b) while some other chapters similarly lean proemployee, like Chapter 5 on discharge in violation of public policy,
others arguably lean pro-employer, such as Chapter 1 on volunteers
and Chapter 8 on employee loyalty and non-competition.
1. Disputed Issues on which Chapter 3 Endorses Broader Employee
Rights
a. The Enforceability of Binding Policy Statements
binding employer policy
The enforceability of "any ...
statement" under Restatement sections 3.01-3.0253 may seem
uncontroversially circular - a statement binds if it is binding - but it
actually is contrary to established caselaw in numerous states that
"view handbook pronouncements as mere statements of policy
without any enforceable effect."4 Most notably, the New York high
court repeatedly has rejected claims that employer "policies" and
"policy manuals" bind, cautioning courts against "lightly" ruling them
contractual so as to "convert" them into something "binding":
Routinely issued employee manuals, handbooks and policy
statements should not lightly be converted into binding
employment agreements. That would . . subject employers who
have developed written policies to liability for breach of
employment contracts upon the mere allegation of reliance on a
particular provision.

51. Id. at 1392 (so noting as to privacy and remedies law).
52. Id. at 1392.
53. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.01(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (as to earned
compensation); id. § 3.02(a),(b) (as to bonuses and other incentive compensation).
54. Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and Policy Statements: From Gratuities to
Contracts and Back Again, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 307 (2017) (collecting cases).
55. Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312, 317, 751 N.E.2d 462, 465 (2001); see
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As to benefits, Restatement section 3.03 does more than reject
New York's presumption of non-bindingness, opining in a comment
that policy statements are how employers often "set ... terms," so
they are "generally intend[ed]" to bind:
In the benefits context, employers are likely to set the plan terms
through unilateral policy statements rather than bilateral
agreements with employees. Employers generally intend these
statements to establish binding commitments while the terms are in
56

effect.

b. Entitlement to Deferred Compensation - Especially Commissions
- Not Yet Paid as of the End of Employment
What happens when at-will employment ends just before the due
date of some compensation other than a basic paycheck covering all
days and weeks worked - most typically, a commission on alreadymade sales, or a bonus for a nearly-completed year? The boldfaced
main Restatement text says nothing on this issue other than that the
terms of the parties' agreement govern." Yet the whole problem is
that employer-employee agreements often are silent about a fired or
departing employee's entitlement to some imminently due lump sum,
like a commission due when a sales period ends, or some fixed-date
bonus or deferred compensation.
While the main text is unhelpful, one of the comments notes that
even absent clear agreement between the parties as to what becomes
of a terminated employee's impending deferred pay, the employer
may be liable in "quantum meruit . .. to prevent unjust enrichment":

Even if no agreement, binding employer promise, or binding
employer policy statement covers the compensation dispute,
principles of quantum meruit may apply. These equitable rinciples
are invoked, when needed, to prevent unjust enrichment.
The above is the comment's entire mention of quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment, but a reporters' note declares more

also Sabetay v, Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 331-32, 506 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1987) (rejecting
plaintiff's claim "that a statement in a corporate personnel policy manual created an
enforceable contractual promise not to terminate him on any ground not mentioned in the
manual, or ... that various corporate accounting policies constituted an employment agreement
precluding plaintiff's termination for refusing to participate in allegedly improper activities").
56. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.03 cmt. d.
57. E.g., id. § 3.01 cmt. d ("In the case of commissions, the employee is paid for sales made
or other unit of output produced, and whether the compensation is earned depends on whether
the sales have been made or other unit of output has been produced in accordance with the
parties' agreement.").
58. Id. § 3.01 cmt. a.
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categorically that an employee may bring a quantum meruit claim
"for the value of the services rendered":
On quantum meruit, see, e.g., Reilly v. NatWest Markets Group Inc.,
181 F.3d 253, 262-263 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Under New York law, the
existence of an express contract governing a particular subject
matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quantum meruit for events
arising out of the same subject matter. New York courts, however,
have recognized an exception to this general rule and have held
that in some circumstances the non-breaching party 'may timely
rescind and seek recovery' in quantum meruit. Thus, in the
employment context, an employee who is wrongfully discharged
and prevented from completing the performance of his contract
may choose between suing for breach of contract or for the value of
the services rendered.").
The Restatement offers further authority for protecting
employees' commission rights in particular, at least in one common
situation: when an employee's tenure ends after a commissiongenerating sale, but before the later date when the employer typically
pays the employee's commission. This is a common situation because
while some commission-paid employees make sales that customers
pay immediately (e.g., in much retail), others receive their
commission weeks or months after closing the deal because they sign
up customers who pay later - e.g., a salesperson of high-end goods in
which a deal is followed by payment weeks later, or a salesperson at a
distributor that sells to other businesses who buy more and more over
time. Whenever a commissioned salesperson's employ ends, she or he
likely has some commission payments upcoming on sales recently
made, but not yet paid for by the customers - which is most likely to
lead to a dispute when one or more of the recent sales was especially
large.
In this common situation of a commission-paid employee's
tenure ending post-sale, yet pre-commission payment, the reporters'
notes take a strong stance in favor of protecting the employee's
commissions. A note to section 3.01 begins by uncontroversially
controls when
noting that the "employment agreement . .
commissions become 'earned."" Yet that note then endorses
relatively recent New York and Massachusetts holdings that that if
parties never expressly address whether departing employees remain
entitled to impending commissions on recent sales, then the employee
is entitled to the commissions - because as long as the deal was closed,
59. Id. § 3.01 cmt. a, reporters' notes.
60. Id. § 3.01 cmt. b, reporters' notes.
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the

commission

is

"determinable"

and

"the

employee[]

produc[ed] .. . a ready, willing and able purchaser":

Commissions are, as a general matter, subject to wage-payment
laws when earned under the employment agreement. Mytych v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 165, 793 A.2d 1068, 1075
(2002) (employment agreement, not state wage-payment law,
controls when commissions become "earned."). For example, the
New York high court has held that "when a commission is 'earned'
and becomes a 'wage' for purposes of [the wage-payment statute] is
regulated by the parties' express or implied agreement; or, if no
agreement exists, by the default common-law rule that ties the
earning of a commission to the employee's production of a ready,
willing and able purchaser of the services." Pachter v. Bernard
Hodes Grp., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 609, 618, 891 N.E.2d 279, 285 (2008).
Similarly, Massachusetts's wage-payment law applies to
"commissions when the amount of such commissions . .. has been

definitely determined and has become due and payable to such
employee . .. " Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,

§ 148. The

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that "the statutory
requirement that commissions be paid when they are 'definitely
determined'
means
when they
become 'arithmetically
determinable.' " Weems v. Citigroup Inc., 453 Mass. 147, 151, 900
N.E.2d 89, 92 (2009)."'

Illustration 5 is drawn from McFeely v. The Seneca Wire

&

The Restatement goes even further in noting that if a
commissioned salesperson brings the employer a customer who "did
not accept" the offered sale "until after [the] employment
terminated," the salesperson still gets the sale commission.
Illustration 5 of § 3.01 so states,62 and a reporters' note cites the
caselaw supporting that conclusion:
Manufacturing Co., 2008 WL 2355602 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (applying
Michigan law). In the absence of an agreement on whether the
salesperson was entitled to receive commissions on posttermination sales, the general rule is that "an agent is entitled to a
commission when his efforts were the procuring cause of sale ..
Id., at *16; see Pachter v. Hodes, 10 N.Y.3d 609, 617, 891 N.E.2d

279, 284, 861 N.Y.S.2d 246, 251 (2008) (on certified questions from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "Under the
common law, a broker who produces a person ready and willing to
enter into a contract upon his employer's terms . . has earned his
commissions") (internal quotation marks omitted).

61. Id.
62. Id. § 3.01 illus. 5.
63. Id. § 3.01 cmt. d, reporters' notes.
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c. Recognizing an Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Bar Terminating to Deprive Imminently Due Pay
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists,
including in at-will relationships," and bars employers from firing
employees to prevent impending compensation, such as an
imminently due bonus or commission, from vesting:
(c) The employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing includes the
duty not to terminate . . or effect other adverse employment
action for the purpose of:
(1)preventing the vesting or accrual of ... [a] right or benefit;
or
(2)retaliating against the employee for refusing to consent to a
change in earned compensation or benefits.65
This doctrine has been controversial. Supporting the
Restatement's recognition of the claim, the reporters' notes endorses a
leading early case recognizing the claim in Massachusetts, Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co.,' plus another leading federal appellate
decision recognizing the claim under New York and New Jersey law,
Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,6 and caselaw from other states
as well.6 Yet those same reporters' notes acknowledge that "[a]
number of jurisdictions have declined to recognize the implied duty in
the at-will employment context," offering a string cite to such
decisions in six states.69
Despite implied covenant doctrine being highly disputed, the
Restatement's endorsement is unequivocal, strongly endorsing its dual
policy bases - "fairness" and "enabl[ing]" deferred-pay relationships
by protecting "expectations":
The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing not only promotes
basic notions of fairness but also enables the parties to enter
into . . relationships where performance is not simultaneous -. ..
for example, the employee renders services but the employer's
obligation to pay for those services does not ripen until certain
conditions subsequent have been satisfied. The imglied duty helps
effectuate the [parties'] reasonable expectations....

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. §§ 3.05(a), (b).
Id. § 3.05(c).
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
769 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying both New York and New Jersey law).

68.

RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

69. Id.
70. Id. § 3.05 cmt b.

§ 3.05

cmt. b, reporters' notes.
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2. Two Limits on the Pro-Employee Orientation of the Restatement
The import of Chapter 3 endorsing the pro-employee side of
several disputed issues should not be overstated, for two reasons. As
subpart (a) below notes, Chapter 3 applies modest nudges, not hard
shoves, toward broader employee rights, as several other
commentators have noted. As subpart (b) below notes, while enough
chapters incline pro-employee to make the Restatement overall a
nudge toward broader employee rights, as the plaintiff's bar has
noted, other chapters incline pro-employer, making the Restatement a
mixed bag ideologically.
a. Only Modest Nudges Toward Broader Employee Rights - As
Shown by the Limited Scope of the Implied Covenant Claim
While resolving several jurisdictional splits by endorsing broader
employee rights, the Restatement does so modestly, declining to adopt
the broadest forms of employee fights pressed by many
commentators and a few states. Others have noted several such
examples. Professor Stephen Befort criticizes Chapter 2 for declaring
that "policy statements" bind (as Chapter 3 also declared) based on
not "unilateral contract" doctrine but "estoppel" doctrine, which
requires showing "reliance," even if some courts "dispense with the
requirement of individual reliance in favor of a rule requiring a
showing only of objectively established group reliance."" Following is
a detailed discussion of one other such example: the endorsement in
Chapters 2 and 3 of a more limited implied covenant of good faith
than exists in some employment caselaw and in commercial contracts.
While endorsing implied covenant doctrine, "[the] Restatement's
odd presentation of the implied duty - only within chapters on
termination and compensation and benefits - possibly limits the . .
application to those two terms," Professor Nadelle Grossman notes,
comparing that limited implied covenant in employment to the far
broader one recognized in commercial contracts7 In the latter, the
Restatement of Contracts declares the implied covenant to bar both a
wider range of "bad faith" conduct and any failure to perform in
"good faith":
[T]he implied duty... refer[s] to definitions of "good faith" and
"fair dealing" under the Uniform Commercial Code. There, good
71. Befort, supra note 54, at 312.
72. Nadelle Grossman, Jettisoning the Normative Value of the Implied Duty of Good Faith
in Employment Law, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. L. REV. 377 (2017).
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faith means "honesty in fact." That test looks subjectively at the
parties,. .. obligates them to make honest judgments[,] ... [and]
also means "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade ...
73
"[A] complete catalogue ... of bad faith is impossible, but the
following ...
[are] recognized ... : evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence. . . , abuse of a power to specify terms,
and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other[']s...
performance." 74 . . . "[V]iolat[ions] . .. [include] conjuring up a
pretended dispute,.. . falsification of facts, . .. taking advantage of
the necessitous circumstances of the other party to extort a
modification[,] . .. rejection of performance for unstated
reasons, ... and abuse of a power to determine compliance or to
,,71
terminate ....
Few jurisdictions ever have adopted a broader version of the
implied covenant than what Professor Lea VanderVelde calls the
"weak, sickly" version in the Restatement." But Alaska comes closest,
having adopted "the most comprehensive and best developed
concept" of an implied covenant in employment. Professor
VanderVelde notes: "Under Alaska law,... [t]he implied covenant
has an objective component requiring that the employer act in a
manner that a reasonable person would regard as fair," and thus one
leading case held that "[i]f one employee is accorded a particular
treatment, then others who are discharged but denied that treatment
may be able to allege that they have been denied the protection of the
[implied covenant]."'

b. The Various Chapters' Ideological Heterogeneity: Some Decidedly
Pro-Employee, Others Decidedly Pro-Employer
While Chapter 3 inclines pro-employee overall, given its mix of
consensus law and nudges toward broader employee rights, the
Restatement overall is not uniformly pro-employee. Other provisions
similarly incline pro-employee. One notable example is Chapter 5,
which declares that "public policy" supporting wrongful discharge
claims may exist in not only (a) state constitutions, statutes, and
regulations, as in most states, but also - unlike in many states - (b)

73.

Id. at 382 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (AM. LAW

INST. 1981).
74. Id at 388-89 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d).
75. Id. at 389 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e).

76. Lea VanderVelde, Where is the Concept of Good Faith in the Restatement of
Employment?, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. L. REv. 335 (2017).
77. Id. at 370 (citing Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska, 193 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2008).
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similar provisions of federal law, (c) common-law "decisional law,"
(d) local ordinances and regulations, and (e) potentially private
sources of "public policy" if they amount to "well-established
principles in a professionalor occupational code of conduct protective
of the public interest."" This breadth of sources of "public policies"
barring discharges is far from universal, the reporters' notes concede,
citing caselaw finding insufficient local law79 and private occupational
codes," and further elaborating as follows:
Other courts . .. insist that an employee

. ..

claim[ing] wrongful

.

discharge in violation of public policy identify a specific
constitutional, legislative, or administrative provision embodying or
articulating the policy . . .
Some courts reject federal law ...

as a ...

source of state public

.

policy ...

Some courts are reluctant to predicate a public-policy tort action
only on judge-made law."
Yet other chapters incline pro-employer. One such example
appears near the very start of the Restatement: Chapter 1 takes a
surprisingly strong pro-employer stance on an issue highly disputed in
the caselaw - "employee" status for those voluntarily working unpaid.
Section 1.02 all but presumes the answer in its title:
§ 1.02. Volunteers Are Not Employees. An individual is a volunteer
and not an employee if the individual renders uncoerced services to
a principal without being offered a material inducement.8
A comment elaborates that unpaid "interns" fall into this declaration
of non-employee status: "Interns who provide services without
compensation or a clear promise of future employment generally are
not employees."8

1

Most of the disputes about "employee" status for the unpaid are
under not the common law, but statutes, most notably wage rights
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)" and unionization rights

78. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (emphases added).
79. Id. § 5.03 cmt. c, reporters' notes (collecting cases).
80. Id. § 5.03 cmt. f, reporters' notes (citing Wright v. Shriners Hosp., 589 N.E.2d 1241,
1244 (Mass. 1992) ("We would hesitate to declare that the ethical code of a private professional
organization can be a source of recognized public policy.")).
81. Id. § 5.03 cmt. a, reporters' notes (collecting cases).
82. Id. § 5.03 cmt. c, reporters' notes (collecting cases).
83. Id. § 5.03 cmt. d, reporters' notes (collecting cases).
84. Id. § 1.02.
85. Id. § 1.02 cmt. g.
86. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
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under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" - so a reporters' note
declares them distinguishable: "Particular legislation may provide for
a different treatment of volunteers than the common-law rule stated
in this Section."" That note proceeds to concede that the FLSA
grants minimum and overtime wage rights to various interns and
trainees who might not qualify as common-law employees. 9 But the
Restatement's cursory statutes-are-different declaration defies the
extent to which caselaw, and the Restatement itself, apply statutory
precedents in common-law cases, and vice-versa: "[T]he NLRB
already purports to use the common law test for NLRA cases, and the
Restatement takes for its own illustrations two Title VII cases,"
Professors Charlotte Garden and Joseph Slater observe. 0 A recent
leading FLSA case, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.,91 does not
apply anything like the blunt "not employees" announcement of
section 1.02, instead listing seven factors relevant to the "primary
beneficiary" analysis, but then noting that even those seven factors
are not enough, because the inquiry is so highly context- and factspecific:
[T]he context of unpaid internships . . requires weighing and
balancing all of the circumstances. No one factor is dispositive and
every factor need not point in the same direction .... In addition,

.

the factors we specify are non-exhaustive - courts may consider
relevant evidence beyond the specified factors in appropriate
cases. ... [T]he touchstone of this analysis is the "economic reality"
of the relationship . .
So the Restatement decides by fiat in declaring that, despite how
fact-specific the "employee" status of the unpaid is in the statutory
87. See generally Charlotte Garden & Joseph Slater, Comments on Restatement of
Employment Law (Third), Chapter1, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. L. REv. 265 (2017) (discussing
NLRA cases on "employee" status for college athletes, research assistants, and others).
88. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02 cmt. g, reporters' notes.
89. Particular legislation may provide for a different treatment of volunteers than the
common-law rule stated in this Section. For example, the FLSA broadly defines the term
"employ" to include "to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) [2012]. In Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152-153 (1947), the Court held this language did not
encompass a private railroad company's training program because the trainees worked "for
their own advantage" and "the railroads receive[d] no immediate advantage" from that work.
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor since 1970 has interpreted the
Walling decision to limit any FLSA exemption for training programs to those meeting six
requirements, including that the training be "for the benefit of the trainee" and that "the
employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the
trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded."
Id.
90. Garden & Slater, supra note 87, at 284.
91. 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
92. Id. at 536-37.
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cases, the unpaid are simply "not employees" under the common law
- even though the common-law and statutory analyses are not
separate in the caselaw, or even in the Restatement itself.
C. Imperfections in the Craftsmanshipof the Restatement: Inapt Cases;
and a Confusing Mix of Text, Comments, Illustrations,and Notes
1. Inapt and Overstated Caselaw
I am somewhat uncomfortable criticizing the caselaw citations of
the Restatement - a sufficiently massive and lengthy undertaking that
perfection is unrealistic. So I do not mean for the following to be
criticisms of the ability, care, or effort of any author of the
Restatement. Yet to the extent that the Restatement is a serious effort
to offer courts persuasive authority, imperfections in its caselaw
citations limit how persuasive it can be, at least as to the topics on
which its caselaw does not persuasively support, or even apply well to,
its conclusions.
a. Inapt Quantum Meruit Caselaw: Reilly v. NatWest Markets Group
After a comment declares with no case citations that "[e]ven if
no agreement ...
covers the compensation dispute, principles of
quantum meruit may apply ... to prevent unjust enrichment,"93 a
reporters' note cites Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group,94 with a
parenthetical and no further elaboration of the case or its relevance.
On quantum meruit, see, e.g., Reilly v. NatWest Markets Group Inc.,
181 F.3d 253, 262-263 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Under New York law, the
existence of an express contract governing a particular subject
matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quantum meruit for events
arising out of the same subject matter. New York courts, however,
have recognized an exception to this general rule and have held
that in some circumstances the non-breaching party 'may timely
rescind and seek recovery' in quantum meruit. Thus, in the
employment context, an employee who is wrongfully discharged
and prevented from completing the performance of his contract
may choose between sui for breach of contract or for the value of
the services rendered.").9

Reilly is inapt authority for the comment it is cited to support.
Reilly follows up on the comment on quantum meruit: that (a) "if no
agreement" applies, then (b) employees may claim quantum meruit.
93. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.01 cmt. a.
94. 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999).
95. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.01 cmt. a, reporters' notes.
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Mr. Reilly, however, (a) did have an "express contract" guaranteeing
compensation for a specified period 9 and thus (b) lost a quantum
meruit claim.' When the Restatement asserts the availability of a claim
(quantum meruit) in a particular situation (an employee without a
contract), it should do better than citing one case in which that claim
was unavailable because the situation was the opposite (an employee
with a contract).
b. Unexplained Citations to Conflicting Cases in a State: Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreetand Zwolanek v. Baker Manufacturing
After section 3.05 recognizes implied covenant of good faith
claims when employers terminate employees to deprive them of
deferred pay about to come due, comment b elaborates most of the
substance of the rationale for the claim (the other comments
elaborate secondary points), and the reporters' note on comment b
does the heavy lifting of surveying the split among states on the issue:
* the note begins with a paragraph on the leading case
recognizing such implied covenant claims, Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co.;98

* the second to third paragraphs cite "similar rulings" - including
99 and
Wisconsin's Zwolanek v. Baker Manufacturing;
* the fourth paragraph cites how "[a] number of jurisdictions
have declined to recognize the implied duty in the at-will
employment context" - including Wisconsin's Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet.'00
The note never tries to harmonize the two opposing cases from
the same state supreme court, nor to show how the pro-implied
covenant case from 1912 supporting the Restatement's position
(Zwolanek) might have survived the anti-implied covenant case from
1983 contravening the Restatement's position (Brockmeyer). In all
fairness, the incoherence is the original sin of the Wisconsin judiciary,
96. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 259 ("The parties entered into an express contract guaranteeing
Reilly's employment for 1994 and 1995 under the following terms.").
97. Id at 263 ("[The] jury determined that Reilly had an enforceable contract that
governed his termination. Once that jury found that Reilly had an enforceable contract, he
could not seek to recover under quantum meruit . . . .").
98. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), cited in RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.05 cmt. b,
reporters' notes.
99. 137 N.W. 769, 773 (Wis. 1912), cited in RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.05 cmt. b,
reporters' notes.
100. 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983), cited in RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.05 cmt. b,
reporters' notes.
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not of the Restatement: the 1983 decision (Brockmeyer) does not even
cite the contrary 1912 one (Zwolanek); and literally no Wisconsin
decisions cite both decisions, so none try either to harmonize them or
to note the extent to which Brockmeyer abrogated Zwolanek. But
while the Restatement did not create the mess, Restatements have
value mainly to the extent that they clean up courts' messes, such as
caselaw gaps where courts have not addressed a point or caselaw
conflicts such as this Wisconsin incoherence. The persuasive power of
the Restatement suffers from its citation to flatly conflicting holdings
from the same court with no attempt to harmonize, nor to recognize
that the more recent case undercuts the Restatement's position.
Chapter 3 is not alone in its infrequent, yet material, mis-steps in
citing authority for the positions it takes on important issues that are
contested among the states. Chapters 1 and 2 suffer similar
shortcomings, as an example from each shows.
-

c. Citing a District Court Decision While an Appeal Was Pending
Which Ultimately Reversed the Decision the Restatement Cited: Glatt
v. Fox SearchlightPictures
In Chapter 1, section 1.02 discusses the distinction between
"volunteers" and "employees" covered by various employment laws,
with comments collecting and fleshing out the caselaw applying
various employee-versus-volunteer tests."o' One of its citations was to
a district court decision from 2013:
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 2013 WL 2495140, *11-12
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) (declining to apply the primarybeneficiary test to motion-picture production interns).1 02
The June 2013 Glatt district court decision was not final enough
to cite as the Restatement did: within weeks, the defense filed a
request for interlocutory appeal,"' which was granted by the district
court in September'0 and by the circuit in November. Established
citation rules bar citing a district court opinion without disclosing a
pending appeal,'" and for good reason: the circuit reversed the Glatt
101.

RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02.
102. Id. § 1.02 cmt. g.
103. Def.'s Interlocutory Appeal Mot., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D.
516 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (No. 1:13-cv-04406-WHP).
104. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 557 (2013)
(granting Defendant's motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal).
105. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting dates
that the court of appeals granted Defendant's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal).
106. See, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.1, at 88 (Columbia
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district court decision, applying a form of the "primary beneficiary"
test" - exactly contrary to how the Restatement described the Glatt

holding.'"
This failure to note the pending appeal that left the status of a
cited decision unsettled was not only bad practice, but surprising.
Glatt was one of the highest-profile, most widely-covered
employment cases of 2013-2015; the pendency of the appeal was
noted in much 2013-2014 coverage, not just locally but in national
mass media," legal media,"o business media,"' and entertainment
medial" 2 alike. The Chief Reporter of the Restatement, moreover, is a
professor with an active management-side employment litigation and
consulting practice in the same state and jurisdiction as Glatt,
including in claims of allegedly misclassified wage plaintiffs,1 3 so he

&

L. Rev. Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) (noting requirement to follow district court citation with:
appeal docketed, [appellate court docket number] ([date])."); id. R. 10.5(c), at 99 (same).
107. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015), amended
superseded by 811 F.3d 528, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2016) (adopting "primary beneficiary" test, with a
multi-factor balancing test incorporated, to determine "employee" status for volunteer interns).
108. I thank Joseph Slater and Charlotte Garden for their article in this symposium that
called my attention to the Restatement's citation to the district court decision in Glatt.
109. E.g., Daniel Miller & John Horn, Lawsuit Challenges a Hollywood Pillar: Unpaid
Internships, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM), <http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/car
eers/ijustworkherella-fi-ct-hollywood-interns-unpaid-internships-story.html> ("Fox has appealed Pauley's ruling.... A ruling by New York's 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals is expected by
early next year."); Tovia Smith, Unpaid No More: Interns Win Major Court Battle, NPR (June
13, 2013, 6:22 PM ET), <http://www.npr.org/2013/06/13/191365440/unpaid-no-more-interns-winmajor-court-battle> ("Fox ...
released a written statement that says the company is
disappointed and plans to appeal.").
110. E.g., Renee Choy Ohlendorf, Employer Violates Labor Laws by Failing to Pay Interns,
ABA LIGATION NEWS (Oct. 4, 2013), <https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigation
news/top..stories/100413-employment-law-intern.html> ("Defendants have petitioned the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for leave to appeal. The appeal is still pending.... The
case highlights a split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals over the proper test.").
111. E.g., Susan Adams, Employers Should Pay Their Interns. Here's Why, FORBES (June 9,
2014, 10:39 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/06/09/employers-should-paytheir-interns-heres-why/#7556db073fc2> ("The confusion may clear up a bit over the coming
months, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals will make a decision on the appeal of the
Fox Searchlight case.").
112. E.g., Eriq Gardner, The Future of Hollywood Internships Now in Hands of Appeals
Court, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 27, 2013, 8:13 AM PT), <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com
/thr-esq/hollywood-internships-future-hands-appeals-660558> (entire article on circuit grant of
interlocutory appeal, beginning as follows: "[N]ext year, the ... Court of Appeals will likely
hand down a ruling that could determine the fate of internships in the entertainment and media
sector. On Tuesday, the appellate circuit agreed to review two cases - one involving former
interns on Fox Searchlight's Black Swan .... Because the disputes are ongoing, the 2nd Circuit
had discretion on whether to grant the interlocutory appeals"); The Latest in Those Pesky
Unpaid Intern Lawsuits, THE FASHION LAW (Nov. 27, 2013), <http://www.thefashionlaw.com/
agreed to
home/the-latest-in-those-pesky-unpaid-intern-lawsuits> ("[T]he Second Circuit ...
hear Fox's appeal in its... unpaid internship lawsuit[,J... Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures
Inc.").
113. E.g., Manigault v. Macy's E., 318 F. App'x 6, 6 (2d Cir. 2009) (Estreicher appearing as
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surely was aware of the notable Glatt decision in favor of allegedly
misclassified wage plaintiffs, including the widely-reported appellate
order allowing an unusual interlocutory appeal to review that
decision.
The Restatement is not a regularly updated treatise or casebook;
each edition typically remains in its published form for decades - so
that is how long the Restatement can expect to be stuck with its
incorrect-from-the start Glatt description and citation. Given this
omission, and the lack of citation-checking it shows, it is hard to trust
any citations in the Restatement from the 2010s.
d. Inapt Citation for Holding "Cause" Includes "Economic
Circumstances": Ohanianv. Avis Rent A Car System
Section 2.04, "Cause for Termination of Employment
Agreements," defines "cause" more broadly for indefinite-term than
for fixed-term agreements. For fixed-term agreements, "cause" exists
only "if the employee has materially breached."11 4 But for indefiniteterm agreements, "cause" can be either "material[] breach" or "when
a significant change in the employer's economic circumstances means
that the employer no longer has a business need for the employee's
services.""' As support for "economic circumstances" as cause, a
reporters' note quotes Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.:"
[I]t would be possible that despite plaintiff's best efforts the results
achieved might prove poor because of adverse business
conditions[,] ...

forc[ing] Avis to make a change... , perhaps

reducing or closing an operation. That... would be just cause for
plaintiffs dismissal.'
For many reasons, Ohanian is very weak support for declaring
that "cause" to terminate without liability includes economic
conditions not the employee's fault.

defense counsel in sex harassment and retaliation case); Vidal v. Metro-N. Commuter Ry. Co.,
No. 12 CV 0248, 2014 WL 413952, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 2014) ("Following resolution of the
[race discrimination] Class Action, as required by the settlement agreement, Metro-North
retained Samuel Estreicher .. . to provide advice concerning ... human resources policies.");
Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (Samuel
Estreicher appearing as defense counsel in wage class action pressing claims that defendant
"misclassified plaintiffs as exempt from the overtime requirements" of federal and New York
law).
114. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

115.
116.
117.
F.2d at

§ 2.04(a)

(AM. LAW INST. 2015).

Id. § 2.04 (emphases added).
779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985).
RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

108).

§ 2.04 cmts. b, c, reporters' notes (quoting Ohanian,779
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* The facts were inapt. Ohanian's was not the sort of indefiniteemployment promise that possibly could be interpreted as
letting the employer cite market conditions to avoid any
liability: the deal was that Ohanian would receive "severance"
even if he breached.18
* The holding was inapt. The decision affirmed a verdict that the
employer did breach119 because it "had not proven ... just
cause."12
* The holding was dicta as to "cause." The conditions-as-cause
discussion was part of only a statute of frauds holding on
whether the agreement could end within a year for "cause"
without "breach."121
* The New York caselaw has not followed Ohanian. In the
ensuing thirty-five years, no New York state cases appear to
have followed Ohanian, a federal decision merely predicting
New York law: no New York cases cite Ohanian to hold that
"conditions" can be "cause" to fire under an indefinite
agreement; and broad caselaw searches turn up no New York
cases, whether or not they cite Ohanian, reaching that
holding.122
Ohanian is a much-cited case for varied reasons: its notable
statute of frauds holding that an indefinite oral agreement is binding
because it could end within a year without breach; and its large
verdict for an employee during the 1970s-1980s period when some,
but not all, courts began enforcing oral promises of job security.1 23
Even if deservedly prominent, Ohanian is an extraordinarily weak
case for the Restatement to quote and rely upon for the proposition
118. Ohanian, 779 F.2d at 110 ("[T]he severance package was to be given plaintiff ... if he
'screwed up' in some manner that would constitute a breach of the contract and defeat his
contract of lifetime employment.").
119. Id. at 103 (affirming judgment for "$ 304,693 in damages to plaintiff ... for lost wages
and pension benefits ... from defendant's breach of a lifetime employment contract").
120. Id. at 104.
121. Id. at 108 ("To illustrate, under the terms of the contract it would be possible that
despite plaintiffs best efforts the results achieved might prove poor because of adverse market
conditions.. . . That .. . would be just cause for plaintiff's dismissal. But if this is what occurred,
it would not constitute a breach.").
122. In addition to reviewing all New York state caselaw citing Ohanian, I did the following
Westlaw searches on the issue.
* (cause/s terminat!)/p employ!/p (insolven! solven!)
* (cause/s terminat!)/p employ!/p (condition!/s (advers! market econom!))
123. Compare, e.g., Toussaint v. BCBS of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Mich. 1980), and
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.Rptr. 917, 924-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), with Montgomery
Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998).
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that "cause" to fire can include "economic circumstances" that are
not the employee's fault.
2. Boldface, and Comments, and Illustrations, and Notes - Oh My:
"Won't the Real [Restatement] Please Stand Up?"1 24

Chapter 3's stances on many disputed issues were bold - except
in the way this Restatement, like other Restatements, scattered its
positions across a byzantine array of different categories of text.
* The Restatement Text, Set Apart in Boldface. The
endorsement of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is in the boldfaced Restatement text of section 3.05, but
the boldfaced Restatement text is mostly sparse and equivocal,
leaving the heavy lifting to the array of other authorities:
comments; illustrations; and reporters' notes.
* Comments Elaborating Upon Sparse Text. The text of sections
3.01-3.02 recognizes "binding policy statements," but the
stronger declaration as to benefits policy statements - that they
are "generally intend[ed]" to bind because they are how
employers

commonly

"set . ..

terms"

-

is

in

only

the

"comments" following the more sparse main text.
* Comments Adding Doctrines Absent from the Text. The
availability of "quantum meruit" claims to prevent "unjust
enrichment appears only in a comment to section 3.01, not in
the section 3.01 text itself. 26
* Reporters' Notes Taking the Boldest Stances. Reporters' notes
are stylistically similar to comments but state stronger, more
detailed positions - such as, after a comment's cryptic
reference to "quantum meruit ...
to prevent unjust
enrichment," adding that employees may recover commissions
from sales finalized after their departures. 27
The Restatement of Employment Law is not transparent as to
why its authors decided which points go into which category; other
Restatements generally say similarly little, other than to praise
themselves for helpfully offering so many categories of guidance. The

124. Cf. EMINEM, The Real Slim Shady, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP, (Aftermath
Entertainment, Interscope Records, Shady Records 2000) ("[W]on't the real Slim Shady please
stand up?").
125. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 3.03 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
126. Id. § 3.01 cmt. a.
127. Id. § 3.01 cmt. b, reporters' notes.
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Restatement of Contracts, for example, expressly noted with pride in
1981 how the new second edition, unlike the first edition from 1932,
added the smorgasbord of categories we now commonly see in
Restatements: ". . . the profound

shift in

style inaugurated

by

Restatement, Second: the introduction of extensive commentary
explaining and expounding the black letter; [and] the publication of
Reporter's Notes canvassing the leading authoritative sources. . . .""
That is not much explanation, beyond basic description, of how a
"comment" differs from a "reporter's note."
Some descriptive differences between the categories are
apparent. The reporters' notes go furthest in taking strong positions;
the illustrations go further than the comments in which they merely
serve as illustrative examples; and the comments go much further
than the sparse Restatement text. And each section is printed in
reverse order of how committal the categories are: each starts with
the sparse Restatement text, then elaborates in comments, then offers
illustrations of what the comments just said, and then states the most
in the reporters' notes.
What does this unnecessarily divided scheme imply? Likely the
reporters' notes are the bolder points for which there was not enough
consensus to put into comments, which in turn were the points too
bold to enact as the sparse text of "the Restatement." But it is in no
way obvious, or mandatory, that the judges, lawyers, scholars, or
insomniacs reading the Restatement must adopt that sequencing as a
hierarchy of authority within the Restatement. I can think of three
ways to interpret the relative authoritativeness of the different
categories.
(1)All categoriesare equal because none of the Restatement binds
anyone, so all points published in a Restatement, in whatever
categories, are just persuasive authorities, with no one of them
more binding on anyone than the other, and with each
influential only to the extent that its merits earn it purchasers
in the marketplace of ideas.
(2) The categories appear in order of authority: actual Restatement
text is what was enacted; comments are what the authors
could not agree to make official text but, in a compromise,
agreed to call the official "comment[ary]" on their text;
illustrations appear within comments but have a different title

128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS foreword (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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to note that they merely "illustrate"; and reporters' notes take
the strongest positions because they reflect what there was not
enough consensus to put in either the main text or the
comments.
(3)Only the boldfaced Restatement text binds as "the
Restatement"; all other categories are mere interpretations of
what actually was enacted, like law reviews or the Talmud.
I have no idea which of the above three views is correct. The
experts on such resources - law librarians - do not appear committed

to any one view either. 1 2 9 I sense the answer is that of a Freudian
therapist: "what do you think it should be?" Take judges: one judge
might view only the main text as "the Restatement"; another might
prefer the more detailed, more committal categories - comments and
reporters' notes - on the theory that persuasive authority has value
only to the extent that it takes a position and gives supporting
authority and reasoning.
Yet if the Restatement's categories are a Rorschach test of seeing
each category however you want, then why have so many categories?
Why segregate reporters' notes from comments, and why arguably
lessen the weight of the useful examples in the comments by declaring
them mere "illustrations" of those comments? Restatement authors
could make their work stronger by either (a) being more transparent
about what each category means, and why certain points (for
example) make it into only reporters' notes, not comments or the
main text, or (b) consolidating into fewer categories, such as
Restatement text plus only a broadened "comments" category that
could include what currently is relegated to sadder "illustration" or
"reporter's note" status.

129. See, e.g., GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, SECONDARY SOURCES: RESTATEMENTS,
<http://stream.law.georgetown.edu/librarymedialsecondary- sources/5 restatements.html> (last
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (tutorial describing Restatements, explaining that each "section of a
restatement ... [is] laid out in a very specific way. First the general principles of the law will be
clearly spelled out. The comment portion ... then goes into greater detail and provides
illustrations as examples. The reporters' notes give examples from and citations to
caselaw...."); SUZANNE EHRENBERG & SUSAN VALENTINE, WHAT ARE RESTATEMENTS OF
THE LAW AND HOW ARE THEY USEFUL IN LEGAL RESEARCH? (1999), <http://www.kentlaw.

edulacademics/lrw/tutorials/restate.htm>
(Chicago-Kent Law Library lecture, similarly
explaining differences between the text, comments, illustrations, and reporters' notes, without
explaining any hierarchy of authority).
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IV. CONCLUSION: NOT THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS, JUST
THE BEST OF ALL FEASIBLE WORK - WITH THE IMPACT OF THE
RESTATEMENT YET TO BE SEEN

Ultimately, the authors' difficulties reaching enough consensus to
avoid hedging by splitting points among various categories was
probably an inevitability, or the least bad alternative. One alternative
could have been to write only points there was enough consensus
about to enact as Restatement text - but that would have deprived the
Restatement of the far more substantial guidance in the comments and
reporters' notes. Another alternative could have been to choose
authors with more homogeneous views, to allow more bold
declarations, including within the Restatement text itself - but that
would have yielded a document lacking the credibility of a
Restatement, yielding something more akin to a multi-author law
review article written by ideologically simpatico comrades in arms.
In the end, all the compromises in the Restatement - as to not
only the breakdown of categories but also the lack of more
resolutions of disputed issues - were the inevitable result of a large
author group with diverse perspectives. The Restatement moved the
ball forward in clarifying employment law for states with sparse
precedent, in resolving a surprising number of disputed issues, and in
nudging the law more toward employee rights in many areas. The
policy choices reflected by the latter choice may be good or a bad,
depending on one's perspective. But in response to criticisms that the
Restatement should have added more clarity, or should have shoved
rather than nudged the law more toward employee rights, my view is
that the Restatement did as much as any written-by-committee
Restatement could to add clarity and greater employee rights to
employment law.
Even if the Restatement has enough merit that it could improve
employment law, will it be used enough to have a real impact? As of
September 2017, it has been cited by twenty judicial decisions: seven
cites to pre-publication versions from 2009 to 2015; thirteen cites to
the published version since mid-2015.o This post-publication citation
rate, about six per year, is far lower than for many other
Restatements.3 1
130. The count of twenty is from a Westlaw search for "Restatement of Employment Law"
among all state and federal decisions.
131. The Restatements in Table 6 are from a list of prominent Restatements followed in the
Virgin Islands, as detailed in a judicial opinion noting the initial date of publication for each.
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TABLE 8:
Average Number of Cites Per Year in Caselaw (State or Federal),
in the Past Five Years, to Various Restatements

Restatement
Restatement of Torts
Restatement of Contracts
Restatement of Agency
Restatement
Restitution

of

Restatement
Restatement
Restatement
Restatement
Employment

of
of Trusts
of Conflicts
of
Law

Cites per
255
75
52

39
19
9

It would be unfair to expect the Restatement of Employment Law
to match the above three. The others all are seventy-five to eightyfive years old,'32 so while many judges and lawyers may not know the
new Restatement of Employment Law, there is likely no still-active
judge or lawyer who ever practiced before those other Restatements
existed. Most of the other Restatements also cover broader subjects
than employment; it is logical that the two most-cited ones cover
areas as broad as tort and contract, followed closely by agency, a topic
relevant to many fields. Still, a mere six cites a year seems low for as
major a publication as any ALI Restatement, and two years after
publication, the Restatement is not yet showing any signs of increasing
citations. Ultimately, if the Restatement of Employment Law remains
so lightly cited, that would be unfortunate, because although it is far
from perfect, the Restatement has enough merit that various fields
Hartzog v. United Corp., 59 V.I. 58, 72-73 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (surveying Restatements that
the Virgin Islands has followed: "the Restatement of Contracts, first published in 1932, the
Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, first published in 1934, the Restatement of Trusts, first
published in 1935, the Restatement of Torts, first published in 1939,. .. the Restatement of
Judgments, first published in 1942[,] ... the Restatement of Restitution, published in 1937[,]
[and] [t]he Restatement of Agency, published in 1933") (citations omitted).
132. Id.
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within employment law could benefit from greater reliance upon it as
persuasive authority.

